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The injured mind in the UK Armed Forces
N. Greenberg1,*, E. Jones2, N. Jones3, N. T. Fear3 and S. Wessely2
1Academic Centre for Defence Mental Health, Weston Education Centre, Cutcombe Road,
London SE5 9RJ, UK
2King’s Centre for Mental Health and Research, and 3Academic Centre for Defence Mental Health,
King’s College London, London, UK
The mental health of the UK Armed Forces is a topic much debated by healthcare professionals, poli-
ticians and the media. While the current operations in Afghanistan, and the recent conflict in Iraq, are
relevant to this debate, much of what is known about the effects of war upon the psyche still derives
from the two World Wars. This paper will examine the historical and contemporary evidence about
why it is that some Service personnel suffer psychological injuries during their military service and
others do not. The paper will also consider some of the strategies that today’s Armed Forces have
put in place to mitigate the effects of sending military personnel into danger.
Keywords: military health; post-traumatic stress disorder; alcohol abuse; stigma;
trauma risk management
1. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY VIEW OF
OPERATIONAL STRESS INJURIES
Before World War 1, there were few, if any, published
reports or studies that specifically related to the mental
health of the Armed Forces. However, the sheer scale
of the shell-shock epidemic brought the issue of
psychological casualties to the fore. From then on,
there has been a steady increase in the number of
scientific papers on military mental health, even if
the advancement of knowledge has not always followed
in such a linear fashion.
In general, the literature can be divided into two
themes—post-combat disorders and issues of manage-
ment, including military culture. These will be
discussed in turn.
(a) Post-combat disorders
The research into the lasting effects of war upon the
mind suggested that post-combat disorders come in
two varieties: overt, short-term, psychological presen-
tations (such as battle exhaustion, flying stress,
combat stress reaction and post-traumatic stress dis-
order) and longer term post-conflict syndromes
characterized by medically unexplained symptoms
(soldier’s heart, aviator’s neurasthenia, effort
syndrome, Gulf War syndrome). ‘Shell-shock’, an
ill-defined term introduced in 1915, included both
the short-term psychological effects of battle and
chronic somatoform cases.
War not only kills and wounds, it also generates some
of the most intense stressors known to man. During
World War 1, it was believed that a healthy individual
who was well-trained and integrated into a unit with
high morale was resistant to psychological pressures. Lt
Colonel Gort VC of the Grenadier Guards and future
leader of the British Expeditionary Force in 1940
argued that ‘in face of strong morale and esprit de corps
shell-shock would be practically non-existent’ [1, p. 50].
It was acknowledged, however, that an exceptional event
could lead to breakdown in a healthy soldier, but a
full recovery was expected once he had been removed
to a place of safety. Shell-shock cases were initially con-
ceptualized as only affecting men who suffered from
hereditary weaknesses. As a result, psychiatric casualties
were considered preventable by selection, training and
leadership. War was not the cause of psychological
breakdown but merely a trigger [2].
The experiences of World War 2 did little to change
these views, so that the hypothesis of inherent vulner-
ability was invoked to explain post-combat disorders
throughout the conflict. However, as the war pro-
gressed, important exceptions were identified and by
the end of 1943, it was accepted that successful sol-
diers had a breaking point [3]. Even carefully
selected and well-trained volunteers, if exposed to
repeated or prolonged stress, could suffer serious
psychological effects. Captains of escort vessels,
bomber crews and commandos, many with decora-
tions for valour, found themselves referred to
psychiatric units suffering from what was then called
‘battle exhaustion’ [4]. However, because these
examples were a minority, and expected to return to
full health, most psychiatric casualties continued to
be attributed to pre-existing vulnerabilities or failures
of selection and training. It was not until the Vietnam
War that this position reversed. With the recognition of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), causation was
turned on its head. The traumatic event became
primary, while family history and personality
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characteristics, hitherto considered paramount, were
relegated to secondary roles. PTSD has become the
psychiatric diagnosis most readily associated with the
Armed Forces, though recent studies have consistently
shown that depression, anxiety disorders and alcohol
abuse have a higher prevalence [5]. Despite some
claims to the contrary, PTSD seems not to be a ‘uni-
versal stress reaction’, arising in all societies across all
time. Evidence from both World Wars suggests that
the ways in which Service personnel communicate dis-
tress is culturally determined and that the
development of PTSD may be one more phase in
the evolving picture of human reaction to adversity.
By contrast, post-combat syndromes characterized
by medically unexplained symptoms have often
defied treatment and led to long-term invalidity in
veterans [6]. Gulf War syndrome was perhaps the
clearest example, though the legacy of shell-shock
affected greater numbers of ex-servicemen. Without
demonstrable pathology or beyond the reach of inves-
tigative techniques, such disorders caught the medical
community by surprise and fed on popular health
fears. They attracted the attention of the media and
provided a focus for veterans’ pressure groups. Simi-
larly, mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), a disorder
brought to the fore by explosive devices in Iraq and
Afghanistan, has much in common with shell-shock
from World War 1 and post-concussional syndrome
from World War 2 [7,8]. Earlier generations believed
that research would distinguish between the physical
and psychological causes of ill health in soldiers
exposed to blast. The Report of the War Office Committee
of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock’ recommended that evi-
dence be sought to limit the term to those cases in
which a ‘causal connection’ existed between ‘the
effects of the explosive force and the symptoms
resulting from the shock to the nervous system’
[1, p. 101]. This endeavour failed largely because
post-combat syndromes are characterized by
common and non-specific symptoms. Furthermore, a
clear-cut distinction between physical and psychologi-
cal injury is unlikely to be realized, not least because
the two coexist.
(b) Psychiatry and military culture
Psychiatry has not always dovetailed neatly into mili-
tary culture. During both World Wars, psychiatrists
were viewed with suspicion by commanders and medi-
cal colleagues who believed that they lacked effective
treatments, while offering malingerers an easy escape
route from the battlefield. Stigma of mental illness
was widespread in the Armed Forces and some
senior officers, such as Lord Gort, argued that shell-
shock ‘must be looked upon as a form of disgrace to
the soldier’ to discourage servicemen from seeking a
psychological discharge [1, p. 50]. A commander of
medical services in Tunisia had ordered Majors
Wishart and Kenton, two newly arrived psychiatrists,
not to disclose their specialist training as ‘he had
promised all the hospitals that no gentlemen with
such an interest would be permitted in the [First]
army’, while Brigadier Morrison, his counterpart on
Malta, refused to allow a psychiatrist to land on the
island [9, pp. 211–212]. Thus, during both World
Wars, it was believed that by their mere presence mili-
tary psychiatrists could undermine the fighting spirit.
In some circumstances, stigma also served the interests
of the military, especially in times of manpower crisis
[10], but came with a price. Indeed, many soldiers
who had served valiantly but who had reached their
breaking point were reluctant to report their illnesses
for fear of ridicule or shame; stigma was such that in
the post-1945 period, admissions registers and case
notes for officers who had been treated for psychologi-
cal disorders were systematically destroyed to protect
their identity [4]. Such beliefs could not be easily
addressed because they reflected the cultural values
of the society from which servicemen were recruited.
Under pressure during both World Wars to demon-
strate an effective role, some military psychiatrists
over-estimated the effectiveness of forward psychiatry,
an intervention designed to treat disturbed personnel
within the sound of battle as quickly as possible with
the expectation of a return to duty [7,8]. When ambi-
tious targets were not achieved during the campaign
for Normandy, for example, not only were individual
mental health officers undermined but the service as
a whole came under scrutiny [4].
The creation of the new category of PTSD by the
American Psychiatric Association in 1980 signalled a
sea change in the acceptance of psychological injury
by the Armed Forces and society in general. During
the Vietnam conflict itself, psychiatric casualties were
actually surprisingly few, apparently at lower levels
than in World War 2 or Korea, causing some to say
that the problem of psychiatric battle casualties had
been resolved. But then came the new diagnosis of
PTSD. Using new concepts, a key study conducted
15 years after the end of the war found that 15 per
cent of male veterans then suffered from PTSD and
about one-third would suffer from PTSD during
their lifetime [11]. These results contrasted with an
earlier study, which had discovered that only 2 per
cent currently experienced the disorder while 15 per
cent had at some time met criteria for PTSD [12].
Putting to one side the question of whether PTSD
was introduced for political or scientific reasons, what
it did achieve by focusing on the role of war trauma
as opposed to predisposition was a slow, sometimes
grudging, but nevertheless increasing acceptance of
psychiatric injury. The problems and debates, however,
did not disappear, fuelled, perhaps by being often reli-
ant on the use of self-report questionnaires in a culture
tinged by stigma that often prevented personnel from
honestly answering questions for fear of the conse-
quences. It would be an optimist who claimed that
this is now a thing of the past.
2. MORE RECENT EVIDENCE FROM UK MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ?
Although the UK Armed Forces had been engaged
in numerous conflicts since the end of World War 2,
it was not until after the 1991 Gulf War (codenamed
OP Granby) that a robust epidemiological approach
to studying the health of the UK Armed Forces
began. Even then, the results of the numerous studies
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into the conundrum that became ‘Gulf War syndrome’
[13] were conducted as a reaction to the substantial
numbers of media-fuelled stories that began a few
years after the end of the conflict. Since the research
efforts began, there have been large numbers of studies
investigating the complex and controversial condition.
Despite this, no single biomedical cause has been
identified which might explain why a substantial pro-
portion of coalition troops suffered, and indeed
continue to suffer [14] from multiple physical symp-
toms which they attribute to service in the 1991 Gulf
War. The UK studies into Gulf War syndrome found
that about one in five of UK Service personnel who
took part in OP Granby reported, and in 2001 contin-
ued to report, more symptoms of poor physical health
than those who had not; the nature of this ill health
remains obscure.
The complex issue that became Gulf War syndrome,
with its negative impact on individual health and insti-
tutional reputations, was an important driver for the
Ministry of Defence (MOD) deciding to formally fund
a wide-ranging, proactive, cohort study into the health
of UK Service personnel who were to deploy to Iraq
in 2003 (These operations were codenamed OP
TELIC). Another important driver for conducting
proactive research was the PTSD class action brought
by ex-Service personnel against the MOD in 2001.
Although the case was successfully defended, at a con-
siderable cost (approx. £20 000 000) [15], it again
highlighted the need to base policy upon research
rather than speculation.
The first UK-focused study into the effects of OP
TELIC, covering the period 2003–2005, found that
overall service in Iraq had not led to an increase in
mental health problems, compared with a comparable
sample of the UK Armed Forces who had not at that
time served on OP TELIC [16]. About 20 per cent
of the military personnel surveyed reported symptoms
suggesting that they suffered from common mental
health disorders (such as depression or anxiety) and
4 per cent reported symptoms of probable PTSD.
However, both combat troops and reservists were at
increased risk of suffering from PTSD, but the actual
rates in both groups remained low, in the region of 6
per cent.
Despite the fears that history might repeat itself,
another notable finding was the absence of any excess
of medically unexplained symptoms—in other words,
there was no evidence of an ‘Iraq War syndrome’
[17], a finding of interest when one recalls that some
of the possible culprits identified as contributing to
‘Gulf War syndrome’, such as anthrax vaccination, pyr-
idostigmine bromide tables and the use of depleted
uranium munitions, were also used in 2003.
The initial OP TELIC studies were, therefore,
somewhat reassuring; even though there were some
groups of personnel who were reporting increased
rates of psychological ill health, the absolute rates
were small. Furthermore, the overall burden of
psychological ill health was generally in keeping with
the rates found in the general population. In another
development, telephone interviews were used to vali-
date the rates found in the self-reported
questionnaire-based survey [18].
3. MORE RECENT EVIDENCE FROM UK
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
However reassuring the initial King’s study results had
been, since the research was completed, operations in
Iraq intensified and there was an expansion of the UK
military presence in Afghanistan. Because the oper-
ational intensity, which had been relatively low in the
early years of OP TELIC, had increased, the numbers
of physical casualties had also increased as described
elsewhere in this issue. As the link between psychologi-
cal and physical injury is well established [2], there was
every reason to envisage that the health of the UK
Armed Forces may have changed, most probably for
the worse, since the earlier King’s studies had finished.
Another driver for conducting further research was
the psychological health of the US military that had
been waging war in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside
UK forces. There had been numerous studies of US
troops that had identified them as suffering substan-
tially higher rates of psychological ill health,
especially PTSD [19]. More perplexingly, US PTSD
rates had been observed to increase with time since
return from deployment [20], the opposite to what
might be expected from other studies of the natural
history of traumatic distress. Therefore, there had
been speculation that the UK would be faced with a
‘tidal wave’ of mental disorders in years to come
[21,22]. Furthermore, US data had found an associ-
ation between multiple deployments and increased
frequency of mental disorders [23,24].
The result was that the King’s College London
research team were asked to extend the original study
to examine three main areas of interest: (i) what was
the legacy of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan
from 2003 to the beginning of 2009; (ii) what was the
impact of multiple deployments; and (iii) had there
been a similar increase in mental disorders over time
since deployment as observed in the USA [5].
In order to meet the study’s aims, all those who had
responded to the first phase of the study [16] were re-
surveyed with the addition of two new randomly chosen
samples—those with recent deployment experience to
Afghanistan, and those who had joined the UK
Armed Forces since April 2003. This sampling strategy,
therefore, ensured that the final sample continued
to be representative of the UK Armed Forces. The
surveys were distributed between November 2007 and
September 2009. The final participation rate was 56
per cent (n ¼ 9990), and the resultant sample included
regulars, reservists and those who had left the military.
Given the high operational tempo that UK forces
had been operating under, the results of the survey
were again both surprising, but in part reassuring
[5]. The overall mental health of the UK Armed
Forces remained good and did not significantly differ
from the results of the earlier study; the prevalence
of probable PTSD was 4 per cent (n ¼ 376), 19.7
per cent (n ¼ 1908) for symptoms of common
mental disorders and 13 per cent (n ¼ 1323) for alco-
hol misuse. However, those engaged on combat
operations and reservists continue to be more likely
to report symptoms of PTSD (7 and 5%, respectively).
These results should not, however, be viewed as
suggesting that there has been no impact of
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deployment; the results clearly speak otherwise. How-
ever, it is of interest that the UK rates, in respect of
PTSD in particular, are different from rates found in
US troops, since both nations operate in similarly
intense environments. Some of the US studies have
suggested PTSD prevalence rates in excess of 30 per
cent [20], whereas the King’s studies had consistently
reported a whole force PTSD rate of about 4 per cent.
Also, previous studies of UK troops who had engaged
peacekeeping duties in the late 1990s had also found a
similar 4 per cent PTSD prevalence [25], suggesting
that a wide range of operational duties did not
impact, substantially, on the overall health of the
deployed force. Studies carried out with deployed
UK troops in Iraq in 2009, and Afghanistan in 2010,
had also found PTSD prevalence rates of less than 6
per cent with higher rates being found in troops
deployed to the most hostile in-theatre locations [26].
The finding that combat troops reported higher
rates of psychological ill health is not surprising given
the nature of the operational duties that combat
troops carry out; the finding that reserve forces
appeared to be more at risk if they deploy is worthy
of some consideration. The increased reporting of
probable PTSD among reservists did not appear to
be a result of experiencing more trauma during
deployment but is instead most probably a product
of the context in which deployment takes place—in
particular, reservists’ lower perception of support
while on deployment, and their domestic and employ-
ment circumstances when they return [27]. It is also
notable that the Browne et al. [27] paper found that
reserve personnel reported higher levels of combat
exposures than regular troops. This seems implausible,
since within the UK Armed Forces it is regular combat
troops who carry out the majority of the combat-orien-
tated duties, the majority of reservists carry out less
risky work, often fulfilling specialist roles that are not
easily filled using regular personnel; such roles include
media handlers, medical personnel and force protec-
tion duties. It is therefore more likely that some
reservists perceived themselves to have been exposed
to higher levels of combat experiences, such as being
shot at or having to handle hostile locals, because of
their lack of prior experience of such situations.
Although the various UK studies have not shown a
substantial mental health effect of deployment, one
recurring finding is that alcohol misuse remains a pro-
blem. The most recent studies show that the reporting
of alcohol misuse is increased among regular person-
nel on return from deployment. Fear et al. [5] found
that the prevalence of alcohol misuse among regulars
was 11 per cent for those not deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan and 16 per cent among those with deploy-
ment experience to Iraq or Afghanistan. These figures,
while concerning for the UK military, may at least par-
tially reflect that alcohol misuse is a major concern in
the UK, and given their socio-demographics and
pre-service background, it is perhaps unsurprising
that members of the UK Armed Forces also consume
large amounts of alcohol. However, the demographic
profile of the Services alone cannot account for the
levels of alcohol misuse found among Service person-
nel who drink more than age- and gender-matched
samples of the UK population [28]. Nor can demo-
graphics alone account for the increased reporting in
alcohol misuse post-deployment. The US military,
despite having different attitudes towards alcohol
use, also report similar associations of alcohol misuse
with deployment and deployment-related experiences
[29]. The reason for this is unclear—post-deployment
alcohol misuse could be secondary to psychiatric mor-
bidity not measured by standard epidemiological
surveys, a biological effect of kindling [30], an effect
found in rodents who voraciously consume alcohol
after repeated cycles of consumption and withdrawal,
or owing to other mechanisms such as military culture,
the nature of the post-deployment ‘unwinding’ process
or because of more tolerance of risk taking as a result
of deployment experiences. Clearly, this is an area
that requires further research.
Another difference between the UK and USA is
that whilst US data suggests that US personnel who
deploy more frequently have more mental health pro-
blems, the latest UK military health research found
no association between multiple deployments and the
reporting of mental disorders [5]. This may be due
to the healthy warrior effect; this is when those who
are struggling to cope with deployment as a result of
physical injury and illness or mental health problems
are made temporarily non-deployable, thus those
deploying more than once might be more psychologi-
cally robust [31]. The finding of no association with
multiple deployments supports the utility in moderat-
ing psychological injury of the UK military’s Harmony
Guidelines [32], which outline the recommended
number of deployments and length of time between
deployments for the UK Armed Forces. Other
research has also shown that it is the actual length of
time deployed over a 3-year period, rather than the
number of deployments, which is a more important
determinant of mental health [33].
Another issue that had vexed the US military was
their consistent finding that the rates of psychological
disorder, in particular PTSD, appeared to continue
to rise over the year following return from deployment
[20]. This finding was somewhat perplexing since the
majority of prior PTSD research had reported decreas-
ing levels of traumatic stress symptoms over time. The
work of Fear et al. [5] found evidence for a small
increase in the reporting of probable PTSD symptoms
with increasing time since return from deployment
among regulars. The prevalence again was low—
ranging from 3 to 6 per cent, and the increase was
not at the same magnitude as seen in the USA [20].
There is no clear explanation for these differences. If
the explanation is delayed-onset PTSD, that is,
PTSD that begins more than six months after
exposure to a traumatic event, then it is hard to explain
why the effect is more marked in US than UK person-
nel, given the similarities in exposure, background,
threat, and so on. Delayed PTSD is in most studies
unusual, although this is often confused with delays
in presentation, which is far from unusual in both
countries [34]. It may also reflect some personnel find-
ing it increasingly difficult to deal with the transition
from an operational theatre to life as usual or concern
about forthcoming future deployments, which may
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possibly explain the higher rate of increasing sym-
ptoms in US personnel as they deploy for longer
than UK troops (12 versus six months) and more fre-
quently. Whatever the nature of the increase, the US
and UK findings suggest that it may not be safe to con-
sider the effects of singular traumatic incidents as
being the same as exposure to multiple incidents
over many months while deployed in a high-threat
environment.
4. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO
SUPPORTING THE MENTAL HEALTH OF
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL
Because of evidence suggesting that operational
deployment may impact upon the psychological
health of troops, especially those with a combat role,
military planners have implemented a variety of oper-
ational stress management strategies. Interestingly,
nations that contribute personnel to current operations
have approached the provision of mental health sup-
port differently, although the approaches to providing
mental healthcare for those personnel who develop
mental disorders are much similar. Although there
are likely to be many reasons for the differing
approaches, the issue of ownership, in relation to
mental health, is likely to be particularly important.
For instance, the UK military stance is that the
psychological welfare of troops is primarily a chain of
command responsibility, whereas other nations place
the role of the leader as the paramount determinant
of the mental health status of a military unit. Other
nations place more responsibility for personnel’s
mental health with healthcare providers, which may
act to absolve leadership of some of the responsibility
that the UK approach to mental health places upon
them. One notable example of the different approaches
to the ownership of mental health can be found in the
use of screening to detect mental health difficulties
which many nations, including the USA, but not the
UK, rely on to detect troops who may be suffering
from mental health problems. However, evidence that
screening is successful in reducing the overall burden
of mental ill health in any military population remains
elusive [35].
One of the UK approaches to supporting the
mental health of military personnel, not currently
used by US forces, is the use of third location decom-
pression (TLD). TLD is a pause in a third location,
that is neither in theatre nor back at home, to allow
troops who have fought together to ‘unwind’ together
before returning to their home base areas [36]. For
UK personnel, the TLD process takes place over
24–36 h in Cyprus in a dedicated military facility.
The various recreational activities on offer to troops
who are decompressing are aimed to promote social
support and allow informal discussions, both of
which have been previously found to be beneficial for
mental health [37,38]. Personnel also receive psycho-
education briefings that focus on the management of
traumatic stress, risky driving and adjustment issues.
Although there has been relatively little robust research
into whether these briefings are useful, what evidence
there is suggests that they may well be helpful for some
[39]. Controlled access to alcohol is also permitted
alongside other structured social activities such as
time on the beach and an evening social event.
A substantial survey of more than 11 000 troops
who had just completed the decompression process,
carried out in 2008, found that while the majority
had been ambivalent or reluctant to engage in TLD
before they arrived, approximately 90 per cent of
troops reported finding their time in Cyprus to have
been helpful. However, although it is encouraging
that many find it acceptable, this does not, ipso
facto, mean that it does reduce the incidence of
post-deployment mental health problems. It is, how-
ever, encouraging to note that those who had the
most concerns about returning home were the most
likely to find it helpful.
Another mechanism for supporting troop’s mental
health is the use of a peer-delivered psychological
first aid process called trauma risk management
(TRiM) [40]. TRiM has been in use for many years
within some elements of the UK military and has
been the accepted pan-service method of dealing
with the consequences of potentially traumatic events
since 2008. The aims of TRiM are to provide person-
nel, who ordinarily carry out a wide variety of non-
medical roles, with the skills to enable them to monitor
how colleagues are coping with the psychological
effects of being exposed to potentially traumatic
events. Some previous attempts to do this, such as
single-session psychological debriefing, turned out to
probably do more harm than good, but there is now
good evidence that this is not the case with TRiM
[40]. Research confirms that the TRiM process is
also highly acceptable to military personnel and
those units that use TRiM function better than units
that do not. One intended aim of TRiM is to reduce
the stigma known to be associated with help-seeking
[41]. While providing peer, rather than professional,
support should be more acceptable to military person-
nel, as yet there is no conclusive data to show that the
use of TRiM has altered stigma. Recent data from a
2010 survey of mental health in Afghanistan showed
that the use of TRiM had increased substantially
since a similar survey was conducted in Iraq in 2009
and that levels of reported stigma were lower in
troops deployed to Afghanistan than to Iraq. However,
it is impossible to be certain that the increased use of
TRiM played a role in the reduction of stigma between
the two surveys. In general, cultural shift takes time,
and it may be some years before it is possible to deter-
mine what impact, if any, TRiM has on the levels of
reported stigma within the military.
5. CONCLUSIONS
While the mental health of service personnel remains a
much debated topic, most probably because the large
numbers of physically injured personnel have brought
the plight of the sailor, soldier or airman to promi-
nence, the adverse psychological effects of war have
been known about for a long time. However, while
PTSD and other post-conflict disorders are now fre-
quently discussed, it is often forgotten that the
majority of Service personnel are not detrimentally
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affected by their time in uniform; in fact, in many
cases, the opposite may be true. Service personnel
often come from the more socially deprived segments
of society and there is robust evidence that pre-enlist-
ment vulnerability makes a substantial contribution to
post-deployment mental health problems, of a similar
order of magnitude to actual events in theatre [42].
Modern research methods have allowed a more
detailed understanding of the factors that influence
the mental health of Service personnel; the senior mili-
tary commanders of World War 1 were correct in their
opinion that selection, training and leadership were at
the heart of the prevention of breakdown. But the
commanders in World War 2, who concluded that
even with the best of preparation, psychiatric casualties
could only be reduced or better managed, but never
eliminated, were also correct. Mental health problems
in Service personnel over the past hundred years of
warfare were and remain a balance between vulnerabil-
ities acquired before a person joins the Armed Forces
and traumatic events during their military service.
While more research will undoubtedly increase our
understanding of why it is that the majority of person-
nel remain resilient to the potentially detrimental
effects of deployment, it is inevitable that some Service
personnel will become damaged as a result of doing
their duty today as they have been in previous wars.
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